(from Chapter 8 of "An Alalysis of Social and Cultural Change in Ayukawa-Hama (Ayukawa Shore Community)", 1994, University of Alberta)

Dr Masami Iwasaki-Goodman
Anthropologist, Hokusei Gakuen Women's Junior College

Results from the interactional analysis of the IWC meetings provide additional insights related to the dominant characteristics of the present IWC. Among these characteristics, the polarization phenomenon most clearly describes the present state of the Commission. Throughout the meetings, there are two distinctly identifiable groups: i) the pro-whaling group and 2) the anti-whaling group. The two groups represent two polarized positions related to the important issues which are currently discussed in the Commission. The anti-whaling group is consistently in the majority and consequently control the decision-making on each given issue. The phenomenon of polarization has caused many deadlocked situations, and added to the cause for Iceland to leave the Commission following the 43rd meeting. The 43rd meeting was also a significant meeting, in that many of the back-stage activities which had been accelerating and increasing the degree of polarization within the Commission, were brought forward on the front stage of the Commission discussions. The nature of polarization within the IWC as an integral part of its discussions and decision making will be further examined in this section based on the findings of the interactional analysis of the IWC meetings.

1) Patterns of polarization

The data gathered in the Working Group meeting, the Technical Committee meeting and the Plenary session of the 43rd meeting was systematically analyzed in a previous chapter (Chapter 7) based on the following variables: intensity of interaction, level of tension, tone of voice, content of verbal exchange, personal/official position distinction and front stage/back stage distinction.

Polarization inevitably involves formation of alliances, which split the Commission into two groups of countries who take opposing positions on various issues. In order to examine the dynamics of the polarization which became apparent in the interactional analysis of the IWC meetings, the situations where extreme splits of position occurred are summarized in the Table 2⁴⁵.

The above table lists the major issues and illustrates the patterns of interaction which resulted in the polarized situations where two opposing positions regarding the given issues are expressed. Such confrontations are eventually resolved by seeking a consensus or voting.

There are important phases in the progress of the meeting that are not illustrated by the given data. The most crucial phase is the Commissioners' meetings, which are held exclusively with the Chairperson and the Commissioners, who may be accompanied by an interpreter if needed. The first meeting of this kind takes place the day before the opening of the plenary session. The frequency of the Commissioners' meetings increases as the meeting processes cause tension to increase.

The outcome of the discussions in the closed Commissioners' meetings influences, to a great extent, the level of tension and the degree of interaction in the plenary discussion. Often, the discussion on some controversial issues is carried out with a very low degree of tension. It may be due to the outcome of negotiations in the Commissioners' meeting which was held earlier.

Another phase of interaction that is not apparent from the interactional analysis of the IWC meetings are the private negotiations outside of the formal discussion in the meeting. During coffee break, lunch break and on other occasions, private negotiations are frequently carried out among individuals and groups. Sometimes, a message is passed around during the meeting to negotiate some detail of the issue under discussion, or to coordinate some action within a certain group. Such interaction is of a private and hence largely inaccessible nature and has not been used in this work.

There are several important points that characterize the patterns of polarization. They are summarized below.

1) The discussion on most of the important issues ends in polarization with two opposing positions resulting in deadlocked situations. Furthermore, the large anti-whaling block succeed in every instance in forcing an unwilling minority to join a consensus decision, or where a vote is taken, are able to defeat any initiative put forward by the whaling minority group. Table 2 indicates that the Working Group discussion, the Technical Committee discussion and the early part of the plenary meeting are used mainly for presentation of positions and establishment or confirmation of alliances on each agenda items. It is commonly seen that the open-ended discussion take place in the early stage of the Commission's deliberation and that the unresolved issues are deferred to later stages of the meeting in which the final decision are made. Table 2 beginning with the fourteenth item, illustrates that most of the major items of the Commissions business, including the Japanese request for an emergency quota for STCW, discussion on schedule 10 (e) which deals with possible modification of the moratorium, the proposed adoption of the Revised Management Procedure, Iceland's request for a quota and the Norwegian request for reclassification of the Northeastern Atlantic minke whale stock, all follow this pattern of developing polarization and inability to develop a consensus, followed by a vote, where the majority view, represented by non-whaling countries, invariably prevails.

2) Polarization frequently occurs during discussion of any non-substantive issues. The ninth item in Table 2 is a typical example when the discussion on possible increase of the NGO observer fees resulted in a pro-whaling versus anti-whaling confrontation. The disagreements on the amendment of the Technical Committee report as seen in the eleventh and the twelfth situations listed in Table 2. are other examples of this nature. The interactional analysis of the IWC meetings presents other cases of confrontation in which the two opposing opinions on non-substantive matters ends in a deadlocked situation, which is resolved by the Chairperson's ruling. These cases do not necessarily involve alliance formation, but illustrate the serious crisis within the Commission that cannot resolve matters in a conciliatory manner.

3) The members of the two opposing alliances are consistent throughout the discussion with an exception during the discussion on the quota request for the Aboriginal/Subsistence whaling made by the USA. The main member of the pro-whaling group are Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Norway, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and The Grenadine, and USSR while the anti-whaling group consistently includes Australia, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, New Zealand, Oman, Seychelles, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK, the USA. Furthermore, as illustrated in Table 2, this pattern of polarization is consistent in any conflictive situations where the members of the Commission disagree.

2) The nature of polarization

Having examined the patterns of polarization above, the following section describes the nature of this polarization. The content of the statements that were made during each polarized situation provides useful information to answer questions about the nature of the disagreement.

a. Conceptual difference as a cause of polarization

Polarization within the IWC occurs because of conceptual differences concerning the present state of whaling issues. The most basic question within a whaling management body as the IWC should be: "Are whales endangered?". This question might be expected to be answered in simple scientific terms, given that the Convention under which the IWC operates requires it to be a science-based whale management body. However, the interactional analysis of the IWC meetings reveals that, within the Commission, there is a serious divergence in understanding the answers to fundamental scientific questions on the status of whale stocks and the means being taken to improve the IWC's management measures.

The verbatim record of the 43rd IWC provides a good example of these diverse views. On two separate occasions, the senior member of the Iceland delegation and the New Zealand delegation each made lengthy statements, in which they make crucial points illustrating their perception of the state of whaling issues.

Appendix 1.3.2 provides the record of the statement made by the senior member of the Icelandic delegation. In this statement, the Iceland representative refers to the three periods in the IWC history. The first period is "a period when whaling was not sufficiently regulated". The second period was "a period of concern amongst a number of members of this organization to try to establish some kind of control over the unrestricted whaling". The third period was "the period which began in 1982 with implementation [of the moratorium] from 1986 in which it can be said that the efforts have been quite successful to deal with the problems of the first period". He further states that the Commission now acts as if the first period was still going on. In conclusion, he urges the Commission to develop a plan for the fourth period: "a fourth period when we cooperate in a decent manner to take account of the interests [JSTCW emergency quota] such as we have had identified before" ( Appendix 1.3.2. ).

While Iceland views the present state of the whaling issue as being in need of a fourth period when the Commission should cooperatively move on to consider various whaling interests, New Zealand expresses an extremely different view on the present state of whaling issue ( Appendix 1.9.1. ). A senior member of the New Zealand delegation, in explaining his abstention on the proposed adoption of the resolution on the Revised Management Procedure, makes a clear point regarding his view of the present state of whaling issue. He refers to the IWC's first management procedure using blue whale units, and says that "...the first attempts based on blue whale unit was an unmitigated disaster". "The second, the New Management Procedure was fatally flawed and continued the process of depletion of whale stocks." ( Appendix 1.9.1. ). While the Icelandic delegate recognizes the success that the moratorium and development of Revised Management Procedure has made in dealing with the problem created by the un-restricted and inadequately managed whaling operations in the earlier periods, the senior member of the New Zealand delegation emphasizes only the failure of the earlier New Management Procedure and warns of the dangers of continuing past failures: "We now have one more chance and if we get it wrong, it will be our last chance" ( Appendix 1.9.1. ).

The above comparison demonstrates the fundamental difference in the understanding of the present state of the whaling problem within the Commission. The Icelandic delegate positively evaluates the recent work of the IWC Scientific Committee to allow better management of whale stocks, while the New Zealand delegate is negative about the effectiveness of the IWC's work throughout the history of IWC including the present. Thus, the question: Are whales endangered? has two answers within the present IWC. Such extreme polarization in evaluating the work of the Commission seriously affects the dynamics and outcomes of discussion in the Commission.

Another example demonstrates the principal matters over which the two opposing groups are in disagreement. The interactional analysis of the IWC meetings presents the situation where the concept of "humaneness" is discussed in two distinctly different contexts: "humaneness" concerning human beings and "humaneness" concerning whales. The discussion of this issue indicate a fundamental confrontation concerning the mandate of the Commission that makes the front-stage interaction extremely polarized.

There was a short, but intensive discussion on the concept of "humaneness" among India, St. Vincent and Japan, listed as the fifteenth situation in Table 2 ( Appendix 1.3.3. ). A senior member of the Indian delegation expressed the view that the issue of "humaneness" toward humans is outside of the IWC's scope of discussion, while the representatives of the St. Vincent and The Grenadines and the Japanese delegation believed that "humaneness" indeed provides the basis of the special consideration given to the various Aboriginal/Subsistence whaling operations. In another interaction, the UK stressed the importance of giving consideration to "humaneness" to whales and proposed a special Workshop of experts to discuss this matter (the eighth and the seventeenth situation in Table 2). In this context, a senior member of the Japanese delegation states his view that the "humaneness" in killing methods used in whaling is outside of the IWC's jurisdictional competence, as it is not mentioned in the text of the Whaling Convention or the Schedule document.

Interestingly enough, the word "humaneness" is used quite differently on these two occasions. When the UK proposed a "humane killing workshop", the word "humane" refers to the humane treatment of animals, in this particular case whales. Whereas, in the discussion on the emergency quota for Japanese STCW, the word "humaneness" was used in reference to the human rights of the local people who would benefit from the proposed emergency quota. It is interesting to note that the UK proposal for the humane killing workshop was, after considerable discussion, passed without vote, however, the proposal for the emergency quota on the basis of the basic human rights of the local people was voted against by the majority and, thus defeated.

These two issues, namely the Japanese STCW emergency quota and the humane killing workshop proposal, involve a number of different aspects that need further consideration. However, they clearly demonstrate the existence of two conflicting views of the IWC's mandate in managing whale resources. The position stated by the Japan - St. Vincent alliance is based on the view that whales are an exploitable resource for the use of human beings whose human rights should be respected in the Commission's management scheme, while the Indian - UK alliance represents the position in which whales are viewed as a class of animals which requires cautious and "humane" treatment by the users of the resource whose human rights are outside of the IWC's mandate.

The Japan - St. Vincent position is a representation of the value imbedded in the "wise use" concept of resource management. On the other hand, the India - UK position represents a value-orientation that forms the basis for the "non-use" position⁴⁶. Such "wise use" versus "non-use" contradiction is also found in the discussion on the issue of the Japanese Scientific permits, where the Netherlands, the UK, the USA and those aligned with their position, argue against the lethal aspect of the proposed research, while complimenting Japan on the non-lethal aspects of the research. The issue here is focused on the action of "killing whales", denying the validity of any activities which involve the killing of whales.

The "non-use" orientation that underlies the anti-whaling position also becomes clear in the statement that a senior member of the New Zealand delegation makes in explaining their position against an adoption of the Revised Management Procedure. He states that the general public will never understand the content of the procedure and that "They will react to its product in the form of whales proposed to be taken and I suspect they won't like a fair bit of what they see" ( Appendix 1.9.1. ). The statement presented by the New Zealand delegate implies that the act of hunting whales is not acceptable irrespective of the status of the stocks or the management procedure being followed. It is these profoundly dichotomous views of "wise use" and "non-use" of whale resource that form the basis of the two opposing positions of the pro-whaling and the anti-whaling groups within the IWC.

b. Domestic politics as a cause of polarization

The political nature of the polarization is a dominant feature of the interactions in the IWC meetings which apparently provides the motivation for many of the actors within the IWC.

There is apparently a correlation between the kinds of issues concerning whales and whaling that satisfy the domestic politics of each country and the issues that receive a high priority in the IWC's discussion.

According to Table 2, two major issues have gained greater importance in the Commission, as demonstrated by the high level of participation in the discussion: one is the issue of the management of small cetaceans and the other is the increased attention on humane killing⁴⁷.

In the debate concerning the third item on Table 2: Commission's competence to set catch limit for Baird's beaked whale in the North Pacific, which took place in the Technical Committee of the 43rd meeting, representatives of twenty-two countries stated their governments' positions. This represents a high level of interaction although the tension was quite low because the actors all knew that they were not at the decision making stage of discussions.

The small cetacean issue was discussed for the second time later in the Technical Committee where the Scientific Committee's review of small cetaceans was summarized and discussed. Spain and Japan stated their well-known positions related to the IWC's lack of competence to manage small cetaceans. New Zealand, the USA, Brazil, Chile, Australia and the Netherlands aggressively expressed their positions in support of further scientific work on the status of small cetaceans. The tension and the level of interaction became significantly elevated and the rapid formation of familiar alliances was noted. It was also significant that, at this stage, Peru officially reported on its national legislation for the protection of cetaceans, and Mexico announced its intention to make a report on its own activities related to small cetaceans in the plenary session. The unusually large number of countries participating in the debate seems to reflect the importance of this issue. This tendency was further heightened in the plenary session when the two resolution on small cetacean were tabled. One is "Resolution on small cetaceans" proposed by New Zealand and other anti-whaling countries (Appendix 3.2 and later revised as Appendix 3.5) and the other is "Resolution regarding recommendations on small cetaceans" proposed by Australia and other anti-whaling countries (Appendix 3.6).

The first resolution was discussed by fourteen countries; however, when it became clear that the resolution could not be adopted by consensus, the Chairperson adjourned the plenary for a coffee break. Later, when the session resumed, he announced that the resolution will be discussed again at a later time in the meeting. This was apparently intended to allow time for further negotiations, so that the resolution might be adopted by consensus. The second time that this resolution was discussed, it had been revised with the inclusion of two clauses: 1) "the provisions which expressed awareness of the differences of views of member states on the regulatory competence of the IWC with regard to small cetaceans", and 2) "conscious of the sovereign rights of coastal states". This recognition of the diverse views on the IWC's competence and the sovereign rights of coastal states allowed the Commission to reach a consensus to adopt the resolution.

Following the adoption of the revised resolution on small cetaceans, the USA tabled the second resolution on small cetaceans. However, the USA asked the Chairperson to postpone the discussion until a later time. The second resolution was then re-introduced toward the very end of the plenary session. After a significant amount of debate on the proposed resolution, involving twelve participants, the resolution was withdrawn. The formation of polarized alliances was clearly seen. The resolution did not reach a consensus for the reason, as Chile summarised: "....it [the resolution] has been mentioned with reference to non-member states' river[ine]..... small cetaceans..." (Verbatim Record 1991:159).

Another issue of significant domestic political importance which has become a major issue within the Commission, as is evident from the interactional analysis, is the issue of humane killing. At the 43rd Annual meeting, the UK proposed holding a workshop to be attended by technically qualified veterinary and other experts to review the killing methods used in various types of whaling since 1980. The proposal was supported by Seychelles, the USA, the Netherlands and New Zealand which represent part of the core of the usual anti-whaling alliance.

The discussion on the proposed Workshop was carried out very actively in the Technical Committee meeting. In the plenary session, the discussion continued with an interesting change in the dynamics in the interaction. Denmark, Iceland and Norway who opposed the idea earlier, shifted their position after proposing a minor modification to the terms of reference for the Workshop to include a comparison with killing methods used for other large mammals. The high tension and active interaction, seen in the discussion, seems to indicate that the humane killing issue has become a major interest in the Commission. How does this phenomenon relate to the domestic circumstances in the countries which supported the proposed Workshop and tabled the resolutions on small cetaceans?

The issue of small cetaceans and the continuation of the moratorium are, no doubt, the main topics of almost every anti-whaling NGO document⁴⁸. The USA-based NGO groups: Cetacean Society International, The Humane Society of the United States, The Animal Welfare Institute, and the UK-based NGO groups: Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, Environmental Investigation Agency and others all produce documents or newsletters for the 43rd meeting in which they discuss these two issues as the main subjects. Representative of such documents, the last page of The Connecticut Whale Vol. XVIII, No.1. (January 2, 1991) announces a Global Cetacean Coalition: "An alliance of over 60 national and international non-governmental organizations" and published a "1991 Policy Statement", which was agreed at their meeting in November 1990. In the statement, the GCC stresses two points: 1) a call for indefinite maintenance of the existing moratorium on the commercial killing of all whale stocks and 2) the competence of the IWC to regulate whaling on all cetacean species. Furthermore, a strong message that the small cetacean issue has become one of the top priority agenda items is evident in the glossy booklets on small cetaceans of the world, produced by the Environmental Investigation Agency for two consecutive years. This organization held a special press conference during the Commission meeting, in order to explain their interpretation that the situation regarding the small cetaceans of the world is in need of immediate action.

There are other groups of NGOs who have different issues as their top priorities. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and Care for the Wild, which are both UK-based organizations, and the USA-based Animal Welfare Institute produced documents in which they discuss "humaneness" in whaling operation. The most elaborate work is done by the RSPCA which produced a booklet, titled "The Cruel Sea: Man's inhumanity to whales". In the preface, it is stated that:

...it is the view of the RSPCA, and countless others that the killing of whales is completely unacceptable. The methods used are inhumane, and, irrespective of moral and conservation arguments, it is upon the grounds of this inhumanity that we urge a complete cessation of all commercial whaling (1991:5).

A comparison of the major issues in the interactional analysis of the IWC meetings and the priority issues in the NGO documents make it clear that the IWC is a forum where some of the member countries try to satisfy the domestic political pressure exerted by the NGOs. The nature of the polarization within the IWC is exacerbated by such political activity which, to a large extent, is directed by the NGO groups.

3) The cause of extreme polarization in the Commission

The earlier examination of the patterns and nature of the polarization within the IWC concludes that it is extreme and of high frequency and points out the fundamental disagreement on evaluation of the IWC's work and the understanding or interpretation of the IWC's mandate in managing whale resource. It was also noted that domestic political motivation generates or exacerbates this polarization. In this section, the polarization phenomenon will be further examined in order to investigate other causes of the extreme polarization within the Commission.

The membership of the two opposing groups: the pro-whaling group and the anti-whaling group, consistently form a majority-minority confrontation throughout the discussion in the IWC. Furthermore, the membership of each group is consistent in that the same countries take the same side on most issues dealt with by the Commission. In all of the polarized situations throughout the various sessions of the 43rd meeting, this majority-minority alliance pattern repeatedly emerged. Furthermore, in the plenary session the majority group, known as the "like-minded group", consistently defeat the minority position when a vote is taken. In all six votes that were conducted in the 1991 meeting, the majority anti-whaling group defeated the minority pro-whaling group. Four out of the five resolution proposed by the majority group were adopted (one was withdrawn by the sponsoring government), while one resolution proposed by the minority group was voted on and defeated. The overwhelming block vote that the majority group use is the most overt outcome of the polarization in the Commission. The formation of alliances that are a significant part of the polarization seen in the Commission enable such coordinated behaviour among the member of the majority group. Such alliance formation is obviously one important cause that make the IWC extremely polarized.

In the past, activities of "the like-minded group" had been back-stage, out of sight of the public, and consequently only suspected or vaguely known, and had never been overtly expressed in the official setting of the meeting. However, in the 1991 meeting, the statement regarding the back-stage alliance was made publically by a member of the Danish delegation, which to that point had been a member of the alliance. When he made a point about the delay of the distribution of the draft resolution that was about to be discussed, he stated "we are working with the so-called like-minded group, it's like working with Icelandic geyser, you never really know when they are able to produce..." (Verbatim Record 1991:134; Appendix 1.5.1. ) As the discussion became tense, when the UK continues to denies the delay of distribution of an important draft resolution, he further states that he observed the distribution of the draft because he thought that his delegation was involved in discussion with "the like-minded group". The back-stage alliance activities were thus brought into the front-stage discussion for the first time by the Danish delegation, who appeared to have been, without their knowledge, suddenly excluded from the like-minded group.

Later in the discussion, in response to Australia and the USA, who explained the reason for the delay of distribution, the Danish delegate states that Denmark was excluded from the consultation and that none of the former whaling countries were consulted. His anger was fully expressed for what he considers "unfairness" on the part of the like-minded group. Furthermore, he presents in public his insightful opinion as a former member of the like-minded group providing interesting information concerning what has happened among the like-minded group members in drafting this important resolution. He says:

The reason for the lateness of this proposal is that there were strong disagreements within the like-minded group. Some of these nations cannot accept the fact that the Scientific Committee almost unanimously has come up with a recommendation for a new management procedure..." ( Appendix 1.7.1. ).

Following the statement by the delegate from Denmark, the internal interaction of the like-minded group was further discussed by a member of the Icelandic delegation. He stated that "the small number of countries who have a firm position against ever opening up whaling seem to be able to prevail upon the majority within that [like-minded] group" ( Appendix 1.8.1. ).

In another situation, a senior member of the Icelandic delegation states his view that the majority power in the Commission is a destructive force in the negotiation process within the IWC ( Appendix 1.3.2 ). "The antechambers" that he refers to are apparently the meeting rooms of the members of the like-minded group who internally consult and then coordinate the subsequent behaviour of the members during the Commission's discussion. It has become apparent that one of the causes of the polarization stems from the formation of the "like-minded group", which discusses and coordinates its collective behaviour in order to most effectively use its majority power.

Another factor in the interactional analysis of the IWC meetings that needs to be further examined is the role of the NGO observers. NGO's participation at the meeting includes more than simply functioning as observers representing domestic interest groups. Rather, they serve as monitoring and reporting agents who frequently provide positive/negative reinforcement to the performance of government delegations speaking tin the Commission. This reinforcement is carried out in different ways. One way is through the daily newsletter, ECO, that a group of anti-whaling NGOs publishes everyday during the meeting of the Commission. Evaluations of the performance by each of the government representatives are publically reported through this means. For example, the last page of ECO Vol. LXXVIII No.3 released on May 29, 1991 criticizes the position of the Danish delegation. The article notes that the Danish Parliament's Environmental Committee's resolution states that the Danish Government supports an extension of the moratorium but that Denmark's opening statement at this meeting of the Commission supports an ad hoc solution for JSTCW. It concludes "This appears to ECO to be acting against the instruction of the Danish Parliaments majority". Statements made by the delegation from Denmark later in the meeting indicates that the Government instruction was changed. This change in Government position may have resulted from the monitoring efforts of NGOs. The reinforcement provided by NGOs sometimes includes serious and intimidating threats made to members of the Commission⁴⁹.

Discussion of the causes of the polarization phenomenon in the Commission has revealed influential activities that are carried out in the back-stage of the IWC. The functioning of the "like-minded group" and NGO observers are important factors in the problematic polarization phenomenon seen in the Commission. Diagram 1 (p.222) summarizes the above findings and illustrates the inter-relationship of the activities that are carried out during the week of the IWC meeting.

The diagram shows the two stages in the Commission: the front stage and the back stage. On the front stage, the discussion takes place among the members of the Commission who are divided into two groups: the pro-whaling group and the anti-whaling group. As described above, NGO observers are part of the front stage scene as non-participating members of the front stage discussion. The members of the anti-whaling group, at the same time, compose the "like-minded group" which operates in the back stage. The back stage activities involve the NGO observers as active participants. While the discussion on the front stage is carried out, NGO observers engage in three tasks: 1) monitoring the performance of the members of the Commission, 2) providing information to the media and the general public, and 3) taking actions to influence the position of each government. The back stage activities are a significant part of the IWC dynamics, in that they are one of the main causes of the extreme polarization of the Commission.

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45 In some situations, formation of alliances is not evident from verbal expressions that are recorded in the verbatim record. However, these situations are important to list, because the patterns in which the split of positions occurs are consistent with previous polarization patterns.

46 Alan Herscovici (1985) recognizes that in the United States, there has been a similar split in conservation philosophy into "no-use" and "wise-use".

47 These two issues have been discussed in the IWC for many years. The issues concerning humane killing were recently intensively discussed in 1980 when the improved penthrite grenade was successfully developed and again at the workshop in 1992. The issue of the Commission's legal competence to manage small cetaceans has also been debated in the Commission for many years. In 1972, the Scientific Committee decided to form a sub-committee to examine the situation concerning small cetaceans.

48 NGO documents have no official status within the Commission as opposed to documents submitted by member governments which then receive an IWC number and which become part of the official record of the meeting.

49 There has been several incidents where NGO observers have made serious direct or indirect threats to members of the Commission as well as other NGO observers.

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